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Casenote
THE END OF INDECENCY? THE SECOND CIRCUIT
INVALIDATES THE FCC'S INDECENCY POLICY IN
FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. V. FCCI
Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . .2
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.3
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 13, 2010, a three-member panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") policy
regulating indecency, forbidding the agency from enforcing its pro-
hibition on indecent speech in broadcast media.4 The interests at
stake are numerous and substantial, and include, on the one hand,
the First and Fifth Amendment rights of not only broadcasters, but
also the media-consuming public. 5 On the other hand are the in-
terests of children and their parents, and also the Government, to
1. 613 F.3d 317, 335 (2d Cir. 2010)
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2010).
4. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox Il), 613 F.3d 317, 335 (2d Cir.
2010) (striking down FCC's indecency policy for "fail[ing] constitutional scru-
tiny"). The Second Circuit expressly rejected, however, any suggestion that its
holding prevented the FCC from establishing a different indecency policy, one
that could pass constitutional muster. See id. (noting Second Circuit holding
passes constitutional muster). The FCC's indecency enforcement dates back to
1975, when it exercised, for the first time, its authority to regulate speech it found
indecent but not obscene. See id. at 319 (recounting FCC's enforcement action
against Pacifica Foundation for broadcasting comedian George Carlin's "Filthy
Words" monologue). Fox II addresses only the petition for review filed in Docket
No. 06-5358, as the other two petitions were previously dismissed as moot in Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 447 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007).
5. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 334 ("[T]here is ample evidence in the record that
the FCC's indecency policy has chilled protected speech."). See also FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) ("It is conceivable that the
Commission's orders may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain language that
is beyond the Commission's reach under the Constitution. Whether that is so,
and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon enough, perhaps
in this very case.").
(527)
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the extent of its permissible role in protecting those interests.6 In
addition, the FCC has recently begun imposing substantial fines
against broadcasters, which jeopardizes the ability of many small
broadcasters to remain in business.7
The Second Circuit held that the FCC's indecency policy vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendments because the policy was un-
constitutionally vague, and therefore, impermissibly chilled
protected speech.8 This holding, together with its underlying rea-
6. See Mark Hamblett, Circuit Strikes FCC Profanity Ban as Vague, Overly Broad,
N.Y. L.J., July 14, 2010, at 6 (quoting statement from FCC Chairman, Julius
Genachowski, saying, "[w]e're reviewing the court's decision in light of our com-
mitment to protect children, empower parents, and uphold the First Amend-
ment."); Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1813 ("Congress has made the
determination that indecent material is harmful to children, and has left enforce-
ment of the ban to the Commission."); Edward Wyatt, FC.C Indecency Policy Rejected
on Appeal, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 2010, at BI (reporting statement of Ted Lempert,
president of Children Now, that court's decision was troubling because "the F.C.C.
has been a critical protector of children's interests when it comes to media"); Press
Release, The Parents Television Council, PTC Applauds FCC Appeal of Fox Inde-
cency Ruling (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/news/
release/2010/0826.asp (reporting statement of Tim Winter, president of The Par-
ents Television Council, that "[t]he airwaves have become a battleground for net-
works to out-cuss, out-sex and out-gore each other; and sadly it is children and
families who are in the crossfire"); Alison Frankel, FCC Requests Review of Circuit's
Broad Ruling on Fleeting Expletives, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2010, at 2 (quoting statement
of Austin Schlick, FCC general counsel, that "[t]he three-judge panel's decision in
July raised serious concerns about the commission's [sic] ability to protect chil-
dren and families from indecent broadcast programming. The commission re-
mains committed to empowering parents and protecting children . . .").
7. See Hamblett, supra note 6, at 6 (reporting that, in 2003, FCC imposed
$440,000 in fines, but in 2004, after issuance of its "Golden Globes" order, FCC
sought $8 million in sanctions against broadcasters); Mark Taticchi, Essay, Avoiding
the Chill: A Proposal to Impose the Avoidance Canon on the FCC, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1102, 1103-04 (2010) ("[L]ocal and independent broadcasters likely will be among
the hardest hit by [FCC's indecency policy] because they do not have resources to
bleep out indecent material during live programming.") (citing Fox Television Sta-
tions, 129 S. Ct. at 1835-37 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (discussing support for proposi-
tion that small and independent broadcasters will be significantly impacted by
FCC's indecency policy)).
8. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 319 (stating holding); see also id. at 330 (analyzing
FCC's policy and concluding it is "impermissibly vague"); id. at 335 ("[T]he ab-
sence of reliable guidance in the FCC's standards chills a vast amount of protected
speech dealing with some of the most important and universal themes in art and
literature."). The Second Circuit panel did not expressly mention the Fifth
Amendment; however, in United States v. Williams, the Supreme Court recognized
that the "[v]agueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). Nev-
ertheless, the vagueness doctrine is related to the First Amendment because, in the
context of speech, the Supreme Court has relaxed the restriction against litigants
whose conduct is clearly prohibited from raising vagueness arguments on behalf of
parties not before the court. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (citing Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 & nn.6-7 (1982)) (recogniz-
ing important exception to traditional requirement when vagueness threatens to
chill First Amendment speech rights of parties not before the court). For a de-
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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soning, questions the FCC's entire mission of eliminating indecent
broadcasts when children are likely to be in the audience by sug-
gesting that the FCC's desired approach, i.e., flexible and ad hoc,
may inherently violate the vagueness doctrine as it is applied in the
First Amendment context.9 Specifically, the First and Fifth Amend-
ments require that government restrictions on speech be suffi-
ciently definite to allow the regulated community a fair opportunity
to conform its conduct to the law.' 0 Moreover, the vagueness doc-
trine requires the strictures of a law to sufficiently cabin enforce-
ment officials to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement."I
The Second Circuit identified these twin goals of the vagueness
doctrine and found the FCC's indecency policy lacking. 12
tailed discussion of the vagueness doctrine in the context of the First Amendment,
see infra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
9. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 331 (acknowledging FCC's perceived need for flexi-
ble standard, rather than simple list of prohibited words, and concluding that
"[t]he observation that people will always find a way to subvert censorship laws may
expose a certain futility in the FCC's crusade against indecent speech, but it does
not provide ajustification for implementing a vague, indiscernible standard"). "If
the FCC cannot anticipate what will be considered indecent under its policy, then
it can hardly expect broadcasters to do so." Petition of the FCC and the United
States for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 10, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, No. 06-1760-ag(L) (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
ogc/MCC-fox.html (select link under heading "FCC Rehearing Petition") (argu-
ing that Second Circuit's Fox II decision makes it virtually impossible for FCC to
develop effective indecency guidelines) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing]. But
see Fox II, 613 F.3d at 335 (noting FCC remains free to create policy that is constitu-
tional); Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 15 (acknowledging that Fox lopin-
ion may allow FCC to return to pre-1987 enforcement policy); Opposition of
Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc. to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing
En Banc at 14-15, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 06-1760-ag(L) (2d Cir.
Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/MCC-fox.html (select link
"Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc." under heading "Rehearing Opposition")
[hereinafter Opposition to Rehearing] (arguing, in opposition to FCC's petition
for rehearing, that Fox II decision does not effectively foreclose creation of inde-
cency policy that is constitutional).
10. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding
law unconstitutionally vague if persons "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application"); Grayned v. Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly."); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (recognizing that with
laws "capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the
[vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other con-
texts") (internal citation omitted).
11. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 ("[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them.") (footnote omitted).
12. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 331 ("[T]he Networks have expressed a good faith
desire to comply with the FCC's indecency regime. They simply want to know with
some degree of certainty what the policy is so that they can comply with it."); id. at
2011] 529
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Section II of this note presents the factual background and
procedural history of Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II). 13
This covers the circumstances surrounding the specific broadcasts
that drew the FCC's attention and the numerous orders the agency
generated in response.' 4 From there, Section II describes the suit
filed by Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al. against the FCC and the
road from the Second Circuit to the Supreme Court, and back to
the Second Circuit.'5
Section III provides the legal background necessary for a com-
prehensive and coherent understanding of the issues presented in
Fox II. This section begins with a discussion of the statutory, admin-
istrative, and case law background of government regulation of the
electromagnetic spectrum in the context of broadcast communica-
tions.16 Specifically, the third section discusses the early enforce-
ment efforts of the FCC, including the landmark case of FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,17 in which the United States Supreme Court
first held that the Government can restrict "indecent" speech with-
out proof that it is obscene.18 Following Pacifica, the FCC's inde-
cency enforcement efforts were relatively minimal, the period being
a sort of "golden age" of clarity, but there were some important
developments, such as the agency's "fleeting expletives" policy,
which was at issue in Fox I. 19 Beginning in approximately 2004, the
FCC dramatically changed its enforcement policy and initiated a
period of aggressive enforcement that gave rise to the Fox II dis-
pute.20 This third section then discusses the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA") and its "arbitrary and capricious" standard for
332 ("With the FCC's indiscernible standards come the risk that such standards
will be enforced in a discriminatory manner.").
13. 613 F.3d 317, 335 (2d Cir. 2010).
14. For a detailed description of the broadcasts at issue in Fox II, see infra note
43.
15. For a detailed discussion of the historical background of Fox I, see infra
Section II.
16. For a detailed discussion of the statutory background of broadcast com-
munications regulations, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
17. 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
18. See id. (invoking farm metaphor and holding that "when the Commission
finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does
not depend on proof that the pig is obscene"). For a detailed discussion of the
FCC's early indecency enforcement efforts and Pacifica, see infra notes 68-86 and
accompanying text.
19. For a detailed discussion of the FCC's indecency enforcement efforts fol-
lowing Pacfica up to approximately 2004, see infra notes 88-109 and accompanying
text.
20. For a detailed discussion of the period between 2004 and Fox II, see infra
notes 33-62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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reviewing federal agency action. 21 Finally, the third section dis-
cusses the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines in the First Amend-
ment context.22
Section IV analyzes the Second Circuit's reasoning and pro-
vides critical insights regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the
decision.23 Finally, Section V discusses the importance of the Fox II
decision and the possibility of review by the Supreme Court.24
II. FROM GOLDEN GLOBES TO Fox 11
A. The 2003 Golden Globe Awards and
Bono's Excited Utterance
Fox II presents a temporally tortuous story of Hollywood awards
shows, citizen complaints, FCC inconsistency, and judicial review at
the highest level. The story behind Fox II essentially begins in Janu-
ary 2003, when Bono, lead singer of the band U2, accepted the
Golden Globe Award in the category Best Original Song - Motion
Picture.25 In his acceptance speech, Bono said, "this is really, really,
fucking brilliant. Really, really, great."26 Following the broadcast,
individuals associated with the Parents Television Council ("PTC"),
among others, filed numerous complaints with the FCC arguing
21. For a detailed discussion of the APA and its application to the FCC, see
infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
22. For a detailed discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, see
infra notes 130-158 and accompanying text.
23. For a detailed discussion of the Second Circuit's decision and reasoning,
see infra notes 159-207 and accompanying text.
24. For a detailed discussion of the importance of Fox II and the develop-
ments since its issuance, see infra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
25. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II), 613 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir.
2010) (describing 2003 Golden Globe Awards show, and particularly Bono's ac-
ceptance speech, as catalyst for FCC's dramatic shift in indecency policy); Official
Website of Annual Golden Globe Awards: Award Search for Bono, HOLLYWOOD
FOREIGN PREss ASSOCIATION, http://www.goldenglobes.org/browse/member/28
459 (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (reporting Bono as recipient of 2003 Golden Globe
Award in category Best Original Song - Motion Picture for song "The Hands that
Built America" from motion picture "Gangs of New York"); see also FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1807 (2009) (describing FCC order ad-
dressing Bono's acceptance speech at 2003 Golden Globe Awards show as first time
FCC regarded non-literal use of "fuck" and "shit" as actionably indecent); Fox Tel-
evision Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S.
Ct. 1800 (2009) (recognizing FCC's response to 2003 Golden Globe Awards broad-
cast as overruling all prior agency decision wherein fleeting use of an expletive was
held not indecent) (citing In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC
Rcd. 4975, para. 12 (2004)) [hereinafter Golden Globes] (regarding prior interpreta-
tions that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of "F-Word" are not indecent as "no
longer good law").
26. Golden Globes, supra note 25, para. 3 n.4.
2011] 531
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that Bono's language, and NBC affiliates' broadcasts of the speech,
violated Congress's indecency statute and the FCC's rules.27
The Enforcement Bureau at the FCC did not agree with the
complaints' characterization of Bono's speech as indecent, how-
ever, and therefore denied their requests for sanctions in an order
dated October 3, 2003.28 The Enforcement Bureau explained that
the Commission defined indecent speech as "language that, in con-
text, depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium."29 Bono's language, the En-
forcement Bureau explained, did not "describe or depict sexual
and excretory activities and organs."30 Rather, "[Bono] used the
word 'fucking' as an adjective or expletive to emphasize an
exclamation." 3 1
On November 3, 2003, PTC filed an Application for Review
with the FCC, asking the FCC to reverse the Enforcement Bureau's
decision.3 2 The Commission granted the Application for Review
and issued a new order on March 18, 2004 that reversed the En-
forcement Bureau's order and rejected its interpretation of the
Commission's indecency definition.33 Despite rejecting the En-
forcement Bureau's decision, the Commission reaffirmed the valid-
ity of the indecency definition that the Bureau interpreted.34
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2010) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2010)
("No licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast on any day
between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is indecent."); In the Matter of
Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859, para. 5 (2003) [hereinafter
Golden Globes (Bureau Decision)] (explaining that, of 234 complaints received con-
cerning 2003 Golden Globe Awards show, 217 were from individuals associated
with PTC).
28. See Golden Globes (Bureau Decision), supra note 27, para. 5 (" [B]ecause the
complained-of material does not fall within the scope of the Commission's inde-
cency prohibition, we reject the claims that this program content is indecent.")
29. Id. para. 5 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Golden Globes, supra note 25, para. 1 (explaining procedural history of
Golden Globes order).
33. See id. para. 12 (reversing all FCC precedent that held fleeting use of "F-
Word" not indecent); see also id. para. 8 ("[W]e disagree with the Bureau and con-
clude that use of the phrase at issue is within the scope of our indecency definition
because it does depict or describe sexual activities.") (emphasis added).
34. See id. para. 6 (repeating and explaining FCC's indecency definition). In
the Golden Globes order, the Commission explained:
Indecency findings involve at least two fundamental determinations. First,
the material alleged to be indecent must fall within the subject matter
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/7
THE END OF INDECENCY?
In opposing the Application for Review, NBC argued that, with
respect to the first prong of the FCC's indecency definition, "fuck-
ing brilliant," as used by Bono in his acceptance speech, was merely
an intensifier.35 The Commission recognized this argument, but
believed that, "given the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' any use of
that word or a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual con-
notation, and therefore falls within the first prong of [its] inde-
cency definition."3 6 Furthermore, regarding the second prong of
the Commission's indecency definition, the Commission deter-
mined that "the 'F-Word' is one of the most vulgar, graphic and
explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language. Its
use invaiably invokes a coarse sexual image."3 7 Moreover, Bono's
language was "shocking and gratuitous," according to the Commis-
sion.38 Finally, while the Enforcement Bureau did not address the
issue of "profanity," the Commission independently determined
that Bono's language was also "profane" within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 1464.39
scope of our indecency definition-that is, the material must describe or
depict sexual or excretory organs or activities. . . . Second, the broadcast
must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium.
Id. (omission in original) (quoting Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case
Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast
Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8002 (2001)) [hereinafter Indecency Policy Statement].
The Commission explained that, in making indecency determinations, the Com-
mission considers "'the full context of the situation critically important."' Id. para. 7
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, supra
note 34, at 8002). Further, the Commission considers three principle factors in its
indecency analysis:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or
excretory organs or activities;
(2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or
excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the mate-
rial appears to have been presented for its shock value.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 34, at
8003).
35. See id. para. 8 n.23 (recognizing NBC's argument that "fucking" can mean
"really" and "very").
36. Id. para. 8 (emphasis added).
37. Id. para. 9 (emphasis added).
38. Id. The Commission further explained that "[t] he fact that the use of this
word may have been unintentional is irrelevant; it still has the same effect of expos-
ing children to indecent language." Id. Despite its past position regarding fleeting
expletives, the Commission felt this new interpretation "furthers [its] responsibility
to safeguard the well-being of the nation's children from the most objectionable,
most offensive language." Id.
39. See id. para. 13 (defining "profanity" as "'vulgar, irreverent or coarse lan-
guage'") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1210 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464) and American Heritage College Dictionary 1112 (4th ed. 2002)). But cf
2011] 533
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In response, NBC Universal, Inc. and several other broadcast-
ers, including Fox, filed petitions for reconsideration of the Golden
Globes order with the FCC. 40 These petitions were still pending on
March 16, 2006, however, when the FCC applied the Golden Globes
interpretation to a host of other broadcasts in an extensive new
"omnibus" order that the FCC believed would "provide substantial
guidance to broadcasters and the public about the types of pro-
gramming that are impermissible under [the] indecency
standard."4 1
B. The Omnibus Order & the Remand Order
Two years after issuing its Golden Globes order, the FCC issued
its sprawling Omnibus Order, which applied an expanded Golden
Globes indecency rationale to hundreds of thousands of complaints
related to broadcasts between February 2, 2002 and March 8,
2005.42 In particular, the Commission addressed the "fleeting ex-
pletive" issue in its indecency analyses of four programs, which to-
gether generated the specific controversy at issue in Fox I& II.43 In
id. para. 14 n.37 (recognizing Commission's past focus on "profanity" in context of
blasphemy).
40. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir.
2007) (mentioning petitions for reconsideration of Golden Globes order by NBC
and several other broadcasters).
41. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. between Feb. 2, 2002
and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664, para. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Omnibus Order].
See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II), 613 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 2010)
(recognizing "pending" status of broadcasters' petitions for reconsideration of
Golden Globes order when FCC issued its Omnibus Order); see also Fox I, 489 F.3d at
452 ("[The broadcasters' petitions for reconsideration of the Golden Globes order]
have been pending for more than two years without any action by the FCC.").
42. See, e.g., Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 72-74 (addressing complaints
about numerous programs, including PBS documentary titled "The Blues: Godfa-
thers and Songs," and applying Golden Globes rationale concerning "fuck" to find
documentary indecent). Additionally, in its Omnibus Order, the FCC determined,
for the first time, that the word "shit" has "an inherently excretory connotation."
Id. para. 74.
43. See Fox , 489 F.3d at 452-53 (discussing four programs specifically: (1)
2002 Billboard Music Awards, (2) 2003 Billboard Music Awards, (3) various epi-
sodes of "NYPD Blue," and (4) "The Early Show"); Fox II, 613 F.3d at 322 (defining
"fleeting expletive" as "a single, nonliteral use of an expletive"). During the 2002
Billboard Music Awards show, singer Cher said, "People have been telling me I'm
on the way out every year, right? So fuck 'em." Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para.
101. During the 2003 Billboard Music Awards show, the following dialogue, from
which one utterance of "shit" was blocked by the broadcaster, occurred on-stage
between actresses Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie:
Ms. Hilton: Now Nicole, remember, this is a live show, watch the bad
language.
Ms. Richie: Okay, God.
Ms. Hilton: It feels so good to be standing here tonight.
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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deciding that the four programs were "patently offensive," the FCC
declared each to be "explicit, shocking, and gratuitous, notwith-
standing the fact that the expletives were fleeting and isolated."44
The FCC chose not to issue fines for any of these programs, how-
ever, citing the apparent exception its previous orders had created
for the "isolated use of expletive."4 5
Fox Television Stations, Inc., along with several other major
broadcasters and their affiliates, side-stepped the FCC and filed pe-
titions for review of the Omnibus Order in court.46 The FCC re-
sponded by moving for a voluntary remand, which the Second
Circuit granted.4 7 After soliciting and reviewing public comments,
the FCC issued a second, revised order on November 6, 2006.48
The Remand Order, in responding to the broadcasters' peti-
tions, limited its analysis to four programs: the 2002 and 2003 Bill-
board Music Awards shows, "NYPD Blue," and "The Early Show." 4 9
The Remand Order largely reaffirmed the Omnibus Order, concluding
Ms. Richie: Yeah, instead of standing in mud and cow [blocked]. Why do
they even call it "The Simple Life"? Have you ever tried to get cow shit
out of a Prada purse? It's not so fucking simple.
Id. para. 112 n.164. In various episodes of the police drama "NYPD Blue" that
aired between January 14 and May 6, 2003, several different characters used cer-
tain expletives, including "bullshit," "dick," and "dickhead." Id. para. 125. During
a live interview on "The Early Show," which aired December 14, 2004, Twila Tan-
ner, a contestant on the CBS program "Survivor: Vanuatu," referred to a co-con-
testant as a "bullshitter." Id. para. 137. Specifically, in analyzing "The Early Show"
under the third of its three principle factors for determining whether a program is
"patently offensive," the Commission determined that, because the language oc-
curred in the context of a morning news interview, it was "shocking and gratui-
tous." Id. para. 141. Indeed, CBS's failure to block this language from a morning
news interview "[was] of particular concern and weigh [ed] heavily in [the Commis-
sion's] analysis." Id. For a list of the three principle factors the FCC considers
when making a "patently offensive" determination, see supra note 34.
44. Fox II, 613 F.3d at 323 (citing Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 106, 120,
131, 141).
45. See Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 111, 124, 136, 145 (recognizing, for
2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards shows, NYPD Blue episodes, and The Early
Show, respectively, that FCC precedent at time of broadcast indicated FCC would
not enforce indecency regulation against "isolated use of expletives").
46. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 323 (listing companies that filed petitions). Fox and
CBS filed their petitions with the Second Circuit, and ABC filed its petition with
the D.C. Circuit. See id. at 323 n.4 (detailing filing of petitions). The D.C. Circuit
transferred ABC's petition to the Second Circuit, which consolidated the various
petitions for a single review. See id. (transferring petition to Second Circuit).
47. See id. at 323 (explaining why court granted remand).
48. See id. (citing Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between
Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand
Order]).
49. See Remand Order, supra note 48, para. I (setting out limited scope of or-
der). For the purposes of the Remand Order, the FCC referred to the various epi-
sodes of "NYPD Blue" collectively as simply "NYPD Blue." Id. para. 1 n.1.
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that the awards shows were properly characterized as legally inde-
cent.50 "The Early Show," however, was neither indecent nor pro-
fane, according to the Remand Order.5 Regarding "NYPD Blue," the
Commission dismissed its order against the program for procedural
reasons. 52
50. See Remand Order, supra note 48, para. 16-41 (analyzing Nicole Richie's use
of "cow shit" and "fucking" during 2003 Billboard Music Awards show and conclud-
ing such use to be indecent and profane, notwithstanding its "fleeting and iso-
lated" nature); Id. para. 58-65 (analyzing Cher's use of "fuck" during 2002
Billboard Music Awards show and concluding use of word indecent and profane).
Moreover, in support of its position that non-literal expletives are still indecent,
the Commission reasoned that "any strict dichotomy between 'expletives' and 'de-
scriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions' is artificial and does not
make sense in light of the fact that an 'expletive's' power to offend derives from its
sexual or excretory meaning." Id. para. 23. Furthermore, "categorically requiring
repeated use of expletives in order to find material indecent is inconsistent with
[the Commission's] general approach to indecency enforcement, which stresses
the critical nature of context." Id. Thus, context is critically important, but con-
textual analysis cannot save certain words, most notably "fuck" and "shit," which
have inherently sexual and excretory meanings, respectively. See id. para. 16
("Given the core meaning of the 'F-Word,' any use of that word has a sexual con-
notation even if the word is not used literally."); Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para.
138 ("[W]e now conclude that the 'S-Word' . . . is a vulgar, graphic, and explicit
description of excretory material. Its use invariably invokes a coarse excretory im-
age, even when its meaning is not the literal one.").
51. See Remand Order, supra note 48, para. 1 (finding "The Early Show" neither
indecent nor profane). Specifically, the Commission cited (1) CBS's argument
that the interview, containing a single occurrence of "bullshitter," was a bona fide
news interview, (2) its own commitment to the First Amendment's free press guar-
antee, and (3) its traditional reluctance "to intervene in the editorial judgments of
broadcast licensees on how best to present serious public affairs programming to
their viewers" before concluding that, in the Omnibus Order, "[it] did not give ap-
propriate weight to the nature of the programming at issue (i.e., news program-
ming)." See id. para. 67-73 (analyzing "The Early Show" complaint). But cf id.
para. 71 ("To be sure, there is no outright news exemption from [the Commis-
sion's] indecency rules.").
52. See id. para. 75-76 (explaining that Commission's indecency enforcement
policy since Omnibus Order requires viewer complaint before FCC action is appro-
priate). In fact, in its Omnibus Order, the Commission held that it would only im-
pose forfeitures where it received a complaint regarding a program aired outside
the 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor period, citing "an appropriately restrained
enforcement policy" as justification for its limited approach. See Omnibus Order,
supra note 41, para. 32, 42, 86 (declining to impose forfeitures without viewer com-
plaints or where program was aired within safe harbor period). Further, the Com-
mission held, somewhat confusingly, that "in the absence of complaints
concerning the program filed by viewers of other stations, it is appropriate that we
sanction only the licensee of the station whose viewers complained .... " Id. para.
86. Given this language, it was not clear whether complaints filed by viewers of
other stations would subject a different licensee to forfeiture. See Remand Order,
supra note 48, para. 73-74 (acknowledging that Court did not address issue of com-
plaints filed by persons residing outside viewing market in Omnibus Order). In its
Remand Order, however, the Commission clarified its policy, holding that com-
plaints from outside the local viewing area of a given station would not qualify,
even when that station did air indecent material outside the safe harbor period.
See Remand Order, supra note 48, para. 75-77 (explaining Commission's require-
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C. The Administrative Procedure Act, Fox Television Stations, Inc.
v. FCC,53 and the Supreme Court
After the Commission released its Remand Order, the broadcast-
ers returned to court for review of the revised order.54 The broad-
casters made a variety of claims, including administrative, statutory,
and constitutional arguments against the Commission's Remand Or-
der.65 The Second Circuit sided with the broadcasters, holding that
the Commission's indecency policy was "arbitrary and capricious,"
and thus, violated Section 706(2) (A) of the APA.5 6 Critical to the
Second Circuit's decision was its recognition that (1) the Commis-
sion's new policy on fleeting expletives reversed nearly thirty years
of precedent without an adequate explanation and (2) the policy's
justification-the "first blow" theory that children are harmed by
even a fleeting expletive-was not rationally related to the actual
ment of local viewer complaints as element of indecency enforcement policy). In
the Commission's words, this enforcement policy "demonstrat[es] appropriate re-
straint in light of First Amendment values . . . [and] preserves limited Commission
resources, while still vindicating the interests of local residents who are directly
affected by a station's airing of indecent and profane material." Id. para. 76. Thus,
an individual living in Alexandria, Virginia was unable to convince the FCC to fine
a broadcaster in Kansas City, Missouri, even though the Kansas City audience had
been subjected to indecent programming outside the safe harbor period. See id.
para. 75 (discussing insufficiency of Virginia letter despite indecent and profane
nature of programming).
53. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
54. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II), 613 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir.
2010) (explaining procedural history).
55. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Petitioner Fox Television Stations, Inc. at 9-10, Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1760-ag(L)),
2006 WL 4900578 (arguing that FCC's new indecency policy is arbitrary, falling
short of Administrative Procedure Act's requirements, because policy is dependent
on subjective and largely unexplained "contextual" circumstances and "community
standards" that FCC has not explained or attempted to define for the benefit of
broadcasters attempting to comply with FCC's indecency policy); id. at 15-17 (ex-
plaining as matter of statutory construction and First Amendment principles that
Section 1464 requires finding of scienter before violation can be determined or
forfeiture levied); id. at 21-25 (discussing vagueness principles in context of First
Amendment and arguing that FCC's new indecency policy is unconstitutionally
vague, violating free speech clause of First Amendment and due process clause of
Fifth Amendment); see also Fox II, 613 F.3d at 324 (summarizing petitioners' argu-
ments in their request for review of FCC's Remand Order).
56. See Fox 1, 489 F.3d at 454-55 (outlining APA and concluding that Commis-
sion's "180-degree turn regarding its treatment of 'fleeting expletives' without pro-
viding a reasoned explanation justifying the about-face" was indeed "arbitrary and
capricious" and violated APA requirements for federal administrative agencies); 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2009) (requiring, in context of judicial review of federal
agency action, that "[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"). For a detailed sum-
mary of the APA, see infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
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policy, which did not ban all expletives outright.57 Finally, because
the Court decided the case along narrow, statutory grounds, the
Court declined to decide on the broadcasters' constitutional
arguments.58
Unsatisfied with the Court's decision, the FCC filed a writ of
certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.59 In a five to four
decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding
that the FCC's new indecency policy was not arbitrary and capri-
cious because "[t]he Commission could reasonably conclude that
the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public
entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent
regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious par-
ents a relatively safe haven for their children."60 Moreover, because
the Second Circuit rendered no opinion on the broadcasters' con-
stitutional arguments, the Supreme Court also declined to decide
them.61 The Court did recognize, however, that the Commission's
orders may indeed chill protected speech, and for that reason, re-
manded the case to allow the Second Circuit to directly consider
the constitutional issues in Fox I.62
III. THE UNIQUELY PERVASIVE PRESENCE OF LOw-VALUE SPEECH,
"ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" DECISION-MAKING,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Broadcast Speech: The Beginning, Pacifica,
and the 2003 Golden Globes
In 1927, Congress passed the Radio Act, Section 29 of which
simultaneously forbade the licensing authority from censoring ra-
dio communications and prohibited all persons within the United
States' jurisdiction from "utter [ing] any obscene, indecent, or pro-
57. See Fox I, 489 F.3d at 458 (finding Commission's reasons for dramatic re-
versal and failure to institute blanket ban on expletives to be poorly-explained).
58. See id. at 462 (citing judiciary's long-standing canon of constitutional
avoidance and declining to decide broadcasters' various constitutional
challenges).
59. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 552 U.S. 1255 (2008) (granting
FCC's writ of certiorari).
60. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
61. See id. at 1819 (citing Court's "usual procedures" of requiring a lower
court opinion before issuing decisions).
62. See id. at 1819 ("Whether (the Commission's orders chill protected
speech], and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon enough,
perhaps in this very case."). But cf id. ("Meanwhile, any chilled references to ex-
cretory and sexual material 'surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment con-
cern.'") (quoting in part FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978)).
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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fane language by means of radio communication." 63 Later, the
prohibitions on censorship and obscene, indecent, and profane
language using radio communications was re-enacted in the Com-
munications Act of 1934.64 The Federal Radio Commission, its suc-
cessor the FCC, and courts have long regarded this language as
prohibiting the prior restraint of broadcasts while still allowing the
licensing authority the power to consider past programming con-
tent when making license renewal determinations. 65 In 1948, Con-
gress revised the federal Criminal Code and incorporated therein
criminal provisions from other titles of the United States Code, in-
cluding the prohibition in the Communications Act on uttering ob-
scene, indecent or profane language through broadcasts.66 Then,
in 1960, Congress gave the FCC authority to impose forfeiture pen-
alties for violations of Section 1464.67
63. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735 (quoting Radio Act of 1927). Section 29 of the
Radio Act reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or sig-
nals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall
be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communications. No per-
son within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1173 (repealed 1934).
64. See Paciica, 438 U.S. at 736 (describing enactment of Communications Act
of 1934); Communications Act of 1934, § 326, 48 Stat. 1091 (codified as amended
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1996)) (clarifying that
Commission does not have power to censor radio communications or "interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio communication"). The current
statute, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 326, does not include the prohibition against ob-
scene, indecent or profane language, which provision was removed from the Com-
munications Act and re-codified in 1948 at 18 U.S.C. § 1464, where it exists today.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2010) (codifying prohibition against obscene, indecent or
profane language).
65. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 736-37 (discussing historical interpretation of the
dual prohibitions).
66. See id. at 738 (providing historical perspective on codification of inde-
cency prohibition into criminal title of United States Code); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.").
67. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 447 (2d Cir.
2007) (discussing Congressional action that vested FCC with authority to fine
broadcasters for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464); 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (D) (2010)
(granting Commission authority to fine persons determined to have violated Sec-
tion 1464 of Title Eighteen of United States Code).
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In 1975, the FCC exercised for the first time its authority to
fine a non-obscene but indecent broadcast.68 A radio station in
New York City broadcast, at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon, a twelve-
minute monologue by comedian George Carlin, during which Mr.
Carlin repeated the seven words that, he claimed, "you couldn't say
on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't
say, ever . . . ."69 A man and his young son, while driving in a car,
heard the broadcast, and several weeks later, the man wrote a com-
plaint letter to the FCC.70 The FCC considered the complaint and
determined that the broadcast was, indeed, legally indecent.7 1 The
FCC chose not to sanction the Pacifica Foundation, but rather, to
use its order to "clarify the applicable standards."72
Pacifica disagreed with the FCC and appealed the FCC's order
to the D.C. Circuit.73 While the case was pending before the D.C.
Circuit, the FCC clarified its position in a subsequent order.74
68. See Fox I, 489 F.3d at 447 (discussing FCC's forfeiture action against
Pacifica Foundation for its broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue).
69. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729. The seven words referenced by Mr. Carlin were
"shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." Id. app. at 751.
70. See id. at 730 (discussing factual background); see also A Citizen's Com-
plaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 56 F.C.C.2d 94,
para. 3 (1975) [hereinafter Pacifica Complaint] (describing complaint received by
FCC in connection with Pacifica's broadcast of "Filthy Words").
71. See Pacifica Complaint, supra note 70, para. 14 (concluding Pacifica Founda-
tion's broadcast of "Filthy Words" to be "indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C.
1464"). The Pacifica Complaint provides the FCC's general theory of indecency,
which persists to this day, and it reads:
The concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as mea-
sured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. Obnoxious, gut-
ter language describing these matters has the effect of debasing and bru-
talizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions,
and we believe that such words are indecent within the meaning of the
statute and have no place on radio when children are in the audience. In
our view, indecent language is distinguished from obscene language in
that (1) it lacks the element of appeal to the prurient interest, . . . and
that (2) when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by
a claim that it has literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id. para. 11 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted). The italicized
language represents the FCC's current general definition of "indecency." See Re-
mand Order, supra note 48, para. 15 (reiterating FCC's general indecency
definition).
72. Pacifica Complaint, supra note 70, para. 14.
73. See Fox 1, 489 F.3d at 447 (discussing Pacifica's appeal to D.C. Circuit).
74. See id. (describing FCC's clarification order); see also Petition for Clarifica-
tion or Reconsideration of In the Matter of a Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Found. Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, para. 4 n.1 (1976)
[hereinafter Pacifica Clarification Order] ("In some cases, public events likely to pro-
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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Upon review of that subsequent order, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that, despite the FCC's clarification, the indecency policy was inva-
lid.75 The FCC appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the FCC's authority to regu-
late non-obscene but indecent speech.76
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize the limited
scope of the Supreme Court's review of the FCC's action. The
Court expressly limited its review to "the Commission's determina-
tion that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast."77 In-
deed, the Court declined to review directly the merits of the FCC's
indecency definition, citing its canon of "review[ing] judgments,
not statements in opinions."78 According to the Court, the FCC's
indecency definition was merely a statement in its opinion, and
therefore, it was limited to the specific factual context of the Carlin
broadcast.79 Because the Court determined that, under the specific
factual circumstances at issue, the Carlin broadcast was indecent
under Section 1464, the Court had no occasion to define the extent
of the FCC's authority.80 Furthermore, the plurality portion of the
Court's opinion declined to address Pacifica Foundation's over-
breadth challenge because its review was limited to "whether the
Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular
broadcast."81
The Court recognized that "of all the various forms of commu-
nication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection."82 In justification of such limited protec-
duce offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity for journalistic
editing. Under these circumstances we believe that it would be inequitable for us
to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language.") (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
75. See Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) rev'd, 438 U.S.
726 (holding FCC's order violates its duty to avoid censorship under 47 U.S.C.
§ 326, and alternately, that its order was vague and overbroad).
76. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (stating holding and
reversing D.C. Circuit).
77. Id. at 735.
78. Id. at 734.
79. See id. (noting that FCC's indecency definition was specific to broadcast at
issue).
80. See id. at 734-35 (explaining federal courts' practice of avoiding constitu-
tional determinations and declining to address FCC's indecency authority except
insofar as relates to specific broadcast at issue).
81. See id. at 742 (plurality opinion) (finding that FCC's Pacifica determina-
tion could not be overbroad because it was limited to specific factual circumstances
at issue, and thus, it could not be applied to future parties).
82. Id. at 748. The first major case to find that the characteristics of the
broadcast medium warranted special First Amendment analysis was Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, the Supreme Court recog-
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tion in the indecency context, the Court acknowledged (1) the
"uniquely pervasive presence" of the broadcast media "in the lives
of all Americans" and (2) its "unique[ ] accessib[ility] to children,
even those too young to read."83 Indeed, the protection of children
from harmful language was the Court's sole concern. 4 The Court
was careful to note, however, "the narrowness of [its] holding."85
Specifically, it recognized that the Commission's own justification
rested on a nuisance rationale wherein context is absolutely criti-
cal. 86 Furthermore, in the minds of Justices Powell and Blackmun,
who provided the two votes to make the Court's judgment a five to
four majority, "since the Commission may be expected to proceed
cautiously, as it has in the past, .. . [we] do not foresee an undue
"chilling" effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights. [We]
nized that, along with prohibiting censorship and various forms of "low-value"
speech in the realm of broadcast communications, the Radio Act of 1927 estab-
lished a regime by which the Federal Radio Commission would allocate the fre-
quencies of the electromagnetic spectrum. See 395 U.S. at 375-76 (explaining need
for government control of broadcast communications). As justification for this
government control, the Court cited the scarce nature of the broadcast spectrum
and noted that, without public control, the "cacophony of competing voices"
would render the broadcast spectrum all but useless. Id. at 376. At issue in Red
Lion was the so-call "fairness doctrine," which generally requires broadcasters to
present discussions of public issues and that each side of an issue is given fair
coverage. Id. at 370. The Court held that the "fairness doctrine," despite its affects
on speech, is constitutional because it "enhance[s] rather than abridge [s] the free-
doms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 375. Further-
more, in the plurality part of the Pacifica opinion, Justice Stevens extended the
concept that broadcast speech receives limited First Amendment protection, ex-
plaining that, in his view, while the Commission's Pacifica order may lead to some
self-censorship, broadcasters would only refrain from broadcasting "patently offen-
sive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
743 (plurality opinion). Moreover, according to justice Stevens, "[w]hile some of
these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amend-
ment concern." Id. Thus, Justice Stevens seemed to suggest the existence of a
hierarchy of value in the context of speech and that indecent speech was of a
relatively low value. Finally, Justice Stevens believed that restrictions on indecent
speech would only affect the form, not the content, of the communication because
"[t] here are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offen-
sive language." Id. at 743 n.18.
83. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
84. See id. at 749-50 (recognizing "the government's interest in the 'well-being
of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own house-
hold'" as justifications for restrictions on otherwise protected speech) (quoting
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63840 (1968)).
85. Id. at 750. The Court's opinion upholding FCC's action against broadcast
of Carlin monologue as narrow and expressly reserving judgment on whether "an
occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanction." Id.
86. See id. (identifying nuisance rationale as foundation of Commission's justi-
fication for sanctioning broadcast at issue and stressing importance of context to
that rationale); Pacifica Complaint, supra note 70, para. 11 (explaining Commis-
sion's belief that broadcast indecency is governed by principles related to nuisance
law where absolutes are rejected in favor of contextual analysis).
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agree, therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge is
meritless."8 7
The FCC took the Supreme Court's narrow Pacifica holding se-
riously, and between 1978 and 1987 the Commission brought no
enforcement actions against broadcasters, largely due to its focus
on the seven words contained in Carlin's monologue.88 In 1987,
however, the FCC issued its Infinity Order, reversing its long-standing
policy of limiting indecency enforcement to specific words.89 In the
Infinity Order, the FCC declared that its focus on seven specific
words "made neither legal nor policy sense."90 Going forward, the
Commission explained, it would judge broadcasts by the policy it
used in Pacifica.9 1 Even after this shift in policy, however, the FCC
continued to tread lightly.9 2 The Commission refused to explain its
"patently offensive" criterion beyond reaffirming its commitment to
87. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 n.4.
88. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 449 (2d Cir.
2007) (recognizing that, after Supreme Court's Pacifica decision, " [i]t was not until
1987 that the FCC would find another broadcast 'indecent' under Section 1464,"
mainly because FCC's focus on specific words made conforming to its policy
straight-forward); In Re Application of WGBH Educational Foundation For Re-
newal of License for Noncommercial Educational Station WGBH-TV, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, para. 10 (1978) [hereinafter WGBH Educational
Order] ("We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding."); see
also Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 FCC Rcd. 930, para. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Infin-
ity Order] (describing April 1987 indecency decisions as first of their kind since
1978 Pacifica decision).
89. See Infinity Order, supra note 88, para. 5 (discussing how focus on specific
words, while making enforcement easier, "could lead to anamolous [sic] results
that could not be justified").
90. Id.
91. See id. (" [W]e shall use the generic definition of indecency articulated by
the Commission in 1975 and approved by the Supreme Court in 1978 as applied to
the Carlin monologue."). Moreover, the Commission reaffirmed its commitment
to a restrained approach, concluding that its enforcement of Section 1464 must be
consistent with the constitutional principles explained in Pacifica. See id. para. 12
(discussing enforcement of Section 1464). Specifically, the Commission explained
that "[it] may only do that which is necessary to restrict children's access to inde-
cent broadcasts." Id.
92. See, eg., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 FCC Rcd. 2703, para. 3
(1987) ("Speech that is indecent must involve more than an isolated use of an
offensive word."); L.M. Communications of S.C., Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 1595, 1595
(1992) (concluding single utterance of "fuck" was "only a fleeting and isolated
utterance which, within the context of live and spontaneous programming, does
not warrant a Commission sanction"); In re Applications of Lincoln Dellar for Re-
newal of the Licenses of Stations KPRL(AM) and KDDB(FM) Paso Robles, Califor-
nia, 8 FCC Rcd. 2582, para. 26 (1993) (concluding that, "in light of the isolated
and accidental nature of the broadcast," use of single expletive "would not appear
to warrant further Commission consideration").
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a contextual analysis where a host of variables would guide its
judgment.93
In addition to the FCC's orders on the subject, several court
cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s evaluated the Commission's
indecency policy for conformity with the U.S. Constitution.94 For
example, in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT I),95 then-
CircuitJudge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the FCC's Pacifica-based inde-
cency policy was not unconstitutionally vague.96 There, the Court
reviewed the policy explained in the Infinity Order, noted that that
policy was nearly identical to the policy in Pacifica, and determined
that the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision had implicitly approved
this policy.97 Moreover, the ACT I court relied on an assurance re-
ceived from the FCC at oral argument that the Commission would
continue to exercise restraint in imposing sanctions.98 Accordingly,
the court believed that "the potential chilling effect of the FCC's
generic definition of indecency will be tempered by the Commis-
sion's restrained enforcement policy."99
93. See Infinity Order, supra note 88, para. 14-17 (refusing to provide exhaustive
list of indecent words, but recognizing variety of variables considered, including
examination of words in context to determine whether they are "vulgar or shock-
ing," manner in which words are used, whether words are isolated or fleeting, abil-
ity of medium to separate adults from children, and likely presence of children in
audience).
94. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1l), 932 F.2d 1504,
1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenges to FCC's
indecency policy); Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535,
1541 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding FCC's policy not impermissibly vague); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
superseded by 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (addressing broadcaster's
vagueness challenge and holding FCC's policy constitutional); United States v. Ev-
ergreen Media Corp. of Chi., 832 F.Supp. 1183, 1186-87 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (reviewing
Pacifica, ACT I and ACT II and concluding "impact of [those] decisions is that
defendants' vagueness challenge to § 1464 must be dismissed").
95. 852 F.2d at 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988), superseded by 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc).
96. See id. (holding that Supreme Court's Pacifica decision foreclosed vague-
ness challenge to FCC's generic indecency policy).
97. See id. (reviewing Pacifica decision and holding that while not expressly
addressing policy's constitutionality, it implicitly did so by affirming FCC's inde-
cency determination). In addition, the D.C. Circuit said that, if it was wrong about
the Supreme Court implicitly approving the FCC's Pacifica/Infinity Order indecency
policy, it "[had] misunderstood Higher Authority and welcome [d] correction." Id.
at 1339.
98. See id. at 1340 n.14 (recognizing FCC's assurance that it would "continue
to give weight to reasonable licensee judgments" regarding their programming
before imposing sanctions).
99. Id.
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In addition, in Dial Information Services Corp. v. FCC, 0 0 the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed the FCC's indecency definition in the con-
text of so-called "dial-a-porn" pre-recorded telephone messages.' 0 '
The court dismissed the vagueness challenge because it determined
that the Commission's indecency definition was clearly defined by a
regulation that "track [ed] [an indecency definition] that it devel-
oped in the radio broadcast context and that passed muster in the
Supreme Court."10 2 Furthermore, the Court held that the District
Court, which had voided the regulation for vagueness, erred in fail-
ing to accord the FCC the deference to which it was entitled as the
agency charged by Congress with administering Section 1464.103
The next major change in policy at the FCC occurred in 2001,
when the Commission issued its Indecency Policy Statement.1 0 4 That
guidance was a milestone because it explained, in one place and in
a comprehensive manner, the three factors the FCC considers when
making "patently offensive" determinations: (1) the explicitness or
graphic nature of the language; (2) the repetitiveness of the lan-
guage; and (3) whether the language was merely used to titillate or
shock the audience.10 5 For each factor, the Indecency Policy Statement
100. 938 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. See id. (discussing "dial-a-porn" indecency).
102. Id. at 1541.
103. See id. (holding that District Court failed to afford FCC required level of
deference) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984)).
104. See Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 34, para. I (explaining purpose
to provide broadcasters with additional guidance regarding FCC's indecency pol-
icy and detailing steps in Commission's indecency analysis).
105. See id. para. 8-10 (summarizing Commission's case law dealing with inde-
cency and discussing principle factors that have proved significant). The FCC's
own language is important and reads:
The principal factors that have proved significant in our decisions to date
are: (1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction
of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells
on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activ-
ities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or
whether the material appears to have been presented for its shock value.
In assessing all of the factors, and particularly the third factor, the overall
context of the broadcast in which the disputed material appeared is criti-
cal. Each indecency case presents its own particular mix of these, and
possibly other, factors, which must be balanced to ultimately determine
whether the material is patently offensive and therefore indecent. No
single factor generally provides the basis for an indecency finding.
Id. para. 10 (emphasis added). The Commission's obvious emphasis of the impor-
tance of context, including the importance of considering the specific factual cir-
cumstances of each case, is particularly troublesome because of the Commission's
decision, in Golden Globes, that the word "fuck," including its myriad variations, is
inherently sexual, regardless of the context. See Golden Globes, supra note 25, para.
8 (explaining its understanding of "fuck"). Thus, according to the FCC, even the
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provided several examples of material that violated the policy.106
Furthermore, the FCC reiterated its belief that "fleeting expletives"
were not actionably indecent because of the second factor.107 In
2004, however, the FCC dramatically changed its indecency policy
with its Golden Globes order.108 It declared that, going forward,
"fleeting expletives" would be actionable, and that reversal of policy
precipitated the litigation at issue in Fox I. 09
B. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA sets forth the full extent ofjudicial authority to review
federal, executive agency action for procedural accuracy."i 0 Fur-
thermore, the APA permits the setting aside of agency action that is
"arbitrary and capricious.""' Under this standard, the Supreme
Court has required an agency to "examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action."" 2 The Court
has made clear, however, that a reviewing court cannot substitute its
use of "fuck" in its interjectory form, such as after one runs into a pane-glass door,
is inherently sexual. See id. (noting use of "fuck" is inherently sexual).
106. See Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 34, para. 13-23 (providing exam-
ples and analyses under each factor). When considering the first factor, the explic-
itness or graphic nature factor, the FCC explained that even the use of double
entendre and innuendo might not save a program if the reference to sexual or
excretory activities is unmistakable. See id. para. 12 (analyzing explicitness or
graphic nature facture). In addition, the first factor considers the audibility of the
material, where less audible or garbled language is less likely to be indecent. See id.
para. 16 (discussing indencency likeliness). Regarding the second factor, the repe-
tition factor, the Commission explained that a fleeting quality would weigh against
a finding of indecency. See id. para. 17 (detailing repetition factor). Even fleeting
language may be sanctioned, however, such as when language references sexual
activity with children or is otherwise explicit or graphic. See id. para. 19 (noting
possibility of sanctioning fleeting language). Finally, in considering the third fac-
tor, the shock-value factor, the Commission explained that the apparent purpose
of the language weighs heavily in the indecency analysis. See id. para. 20 (analyzing
shock-value factor). For that reason, "even where language is explicit, the matter is
graphic, or where there is intense repetition of vulgar terms, the presentation may
not be pandering or titillating, and the broadcast may not be found actionably
indecent." Id. para. 21.
107. Id. para. 18.
108. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 489 F.3d 444, 451-52 (2d
Cir. 2007) (discussing FCC's dramatic change in policy following 2003 Golden
Globe Awards show).
109. See id. (identifying FCC's decision to treat "fleeting expletives" as actiona-
bly indecent as significant impetus of Fox I litigation).
110. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 545-49 (1978) (discussing permissible scope ofjudicial review of ex-
ecutive agency action).
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2009) (listing standard of review for overturn-
ing agency action).
112. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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own judgment in place of the agency's reasoning.113 Moreover, the
reviewing court should uphold an agency's decision where the
agency's reasoning can be reasonably understood, even though
lacking perfect precision." 4 Supreme Court case law generally as-
sumes that federal agencies possess a certain level of expertise in
the industry that Congress has charged them with regulating." 5
For this reason, courts must exercise deference towards an agency's
decisions and the reasoning contained therein.' 16
C. The First Amendment, Vagueness, and Overbreadth
1. Indecent Speech and the First Amendment
Indecent speech is fully protected by the First Amendment.1 7
Nevertheless, because of the special circumstances attendant to
broadcast speech, the Government may place restrictions on such
speech that would not be constitutional in other situations." 8 The
Supreme Court, most notably in Pacifica, has held that broadcast
speech requires special attention because of its pervasiveness in so-
ciety, its ability to penetrate into the homes of Americans without
their exact permission, and its accessibility to children." 9 Moreo-
113. See id. ("[A] court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.").
114. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974) (holding that reviewing court should "uphold a decision of less
than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.").
115. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (recognizing im-
portance of expert administrative bodies and that "our jurisprudence has been
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, re-
plete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.").
116. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's assumption of an agency's ex-
pertise in its assigned field and its vital role to the modern American state, see
supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
117. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) ("[W]e have made it per-
fectly clear that '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is pro-
tected by the First Amendment."' (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989))).
118. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
("[B]roadcast media[ ] presents unique problems, which inform our assessment of
the interests at stake, and which may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable
in other contexts." (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (plurality))); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-49 (1978) (recognizing that broadcasting has received most limited First
Amendment protection, primarily because (1) "broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and (2) "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.").
119. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49 (discussing unique characteristics of
broadcast media).
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ver, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the central reason-
ing of Pacifica.120
In contexts other than broadcast speech, restrictions on inde-
cent speech are considered context-based, and therefore, subject to
strict scrutiny.121 For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group, Inc.,122 the Supreme Court considered a provision of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required cable channels
whose content was primarily sexually-oriented to either fully block
their services, unless requested by the household, or else limit their
transmissions to hours when children were unlikely to be in the
audience, set by administrative regulation to between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m.123 The Court recognized that, while both cable and broadcast
media present similar problems, cable television must be treated
differently because targeted blocking technology exists. 124 The
Court held that "targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning,
120. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 passim (2009)
(recognizing nuisance rationale of Pacifica and all-importance of context).
121. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1l), 613 F.3d 317, 325 (2d
Cir. 2010) ("In most contexts, the Supreme Court has considered restrictions on
indecent speech to be content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny."); Fox
Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1821 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has
declined to apply the lesser standard of First Amendment scrutiny imposed on
broadcast speech to federal regulation of telephone dial-in services, cable televi-
sion programming, and the Internet.") (internal citations omitted). Compare Play-
boy, 529 U.S. at 813 (holding, in context of cable television, content-based
restrictions "must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government inter-
est" (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126)), Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (holding "no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the
Internet]"), and Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding, in context of indecent commercial
telephone messages, government ban subject to strict scrutiny); with FCC v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) ("[B]ecause broadcast regulation in-
volves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same ap-
proach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to
demand that such regulations serve "compelling" governmental interests." id. at
380 ("[Broadcast] restrictions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that
the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest
.) (emphasis added)), Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of communica-
tion, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protec-
tion."), and Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("Although
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differ-
ences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them.") (footnote and internal citation omitted).
122. 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
123. See id. at 806 (discussing factual background).
124. See id. at 813-15 (comparing cable and broadcast media and concluding:
"There is ... a key difference between cable television and the broadcasting media,
which is the point on which this case turns- Cable systems have the capacity to block
unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis. The option to block
reduces the likelihood, so concerning to the Court in Pacifica, that traditional First
Amendment scrutiny would deprive the Government of all authority to address
this sort of problem. . . . [Ilf a less restrictive means is available for the Govern-
[Vol. 18: p. 527
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/7
THE END OF INDECENCY?
and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted blocking is a
feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling inter-
ests." 125 For that reason, the Government's requirement of either
total blocking or day-time blackout was not less restrictive than
targeted blocking, and therefore, failed strict scrutiny. 1 2 6
Normally, the Government bears the burden of proving that its
speech restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 27 Broadcast speech is different, however.128
As the Second Circuit noted in Fox II, Pacifica did not explain ex-
actly which level of scrutiny applies to restrictions on broadcast
speech, but subsequent cases have applied a level of review resem-
bling "intermediate scrutiny."1 29
2. The Vagueness Doctrine
To some extent, many if not most laws are necessarily of uncer-
tain scope, for as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, "between the two ex-
tremes of the obviously illegal and the plainly lawful there is a
gradual approach, and . . . the complexity of life makes it impossi-
ble to draw a line in advance without an artificial simplification that
would be unjust."130 But it may be taken for granted that laws must
exist, and that we must live day to day among them, on which point
Justice Holmes adds, "[t]he conditions are as permanent as any-
thing human, and a great body of precedents on the civil side, cou-
pled with familiar practice, make it comparatively easy for common
ment to achieve its goals, the Government must use it." Id. (emphasis added) (in-
ternal citations omitted)).
125. Id. at 815.
126. See id. at 827 (concluding Government failed to show that's its speech
restriction was least restrictive means of addressing its interests).
127. See id. at 816 ("When the Government restricts speech, the Government
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.") (citations
omitted).
128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
129. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 613 F.3d 317, 326 (2d
Cir. 2010) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984))
(recognizing that Pacifica did not expressly specify which level of scrutiny applies to
broadcast media, but that League of Women Voters used language associated with
intermediate scrutiny); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 374-80
(1984) (analyzing standard of review issue in broadcast media and balanced-cover-
age-of-public-issues context and concluding that "[broadcast speech] restrictions
have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tai-
lored to further a substantial governmental interest . . . ") (citations omitted).
130. Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914).
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sense to keep to what is safe."' 3  Even so, said Justice Holmes, the
law must be more than an "illusory form of words."132
Where there is not "a great body of precedents," however, nor
"familiar practice," the vagueness doctrine serves as a vital safe-
guard against laws that would compel citizens to guess, at their own
peril, whether their conduct or speech comports with the law.' 33
Specifically, unconstitutionally vague laws violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment for "fail [ure] to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited," or for being
"so standardless that [they] authorize [ ] or encourage [ ] seriously
discriminatory enforcement."' 3 4
The vagueness doctrine addresses two principle concerns, and
an additional concern when laws implicate the First Amendment. 35
First, the doctrine requires that a given law adequately provide the
regulated community with notice of what behavior is prohibited,
thereby providing the community with a fair chance at conforming
to the law's mandates.13 6 Second, and perhaps most importantly,
131. Id.
132. Id. at 222. In International Harvester, Justice Holmes was considering an
antitrust statute that made express price-fixing combinations of farmers of certain
crops lawful, "unless for the purpose or with the effect of fixing a price that was
greater or less than the real value of the article." Id. at 221. The plaintiff in error,
i.e., petitioner, argued that the law, as construed, "offer[ed] no standard of con-
duct that it is possible to know." Id. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority,
agreed and noted that, although legally sanctioned, combination there "[was] re-
quired to guess at its peril what its product would have sold for if the combination
had not existed and nothing else violently affecting values had occurred." Id. at
222. The fixed price could be no greater and no less than the price of the article
"in an imaginary world." Id. After all, noted Justice Holmes:
Value is the effect in exchange of the relative social desire for compared
objects expressed in terms of a common denominator. It is a fact, and
generally is more or less easy to ascertain. But what it would be with such
increase of a never extinguished competition as it might be guessed
would have existed had the combination not been made, with exclusion
of the actual effect of other abnormal influences, and, it would seem,
with exclusion also of any increased efficiency in the machines, but with
inclusion of the effect of the combination so far as it was economically
beneficial to itself and the community, is a problem that no human inge-
nuity could solve.
Id. at 222-23.
133. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined.").
134. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citations omitted).
See id. (noting that vagueness doctrine is rooted in Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, not First Amendment).
135. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (discussing three important values that vague
laws offend).
136. See id. ("[Blecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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the doctrine prohibits laws that, through ill-defined terms, provide
government officials an opportunity to exercise arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement. 3 7 Finally, vagueness intertwines with the
overbreadth doctrine when, in the context of the First Amendment,
the ordinary requirement limiting challengers to defending their
own actions is discarded, and challengers are allowed to attack a
statute's scope, even when their actions are clearly proscribed.13 8
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-
ingly."); see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("[N]o man shall
be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably under-
stand to be proscribed.") (footnote omitted); Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to specu-
late as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids.") (footnote omitted); Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessa-
rily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law.") (citation omitted).
137. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) ("Although the doc-
trine focuses both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have
recognized recently that the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine 'is not
actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.'" (quoting
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974))); see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (hold-
ing, with regard to "treats contemptuously" language in flag desecration statute,
"[s]tatutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate
their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.") (citations omit-
ted); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.")
(footnote omitted); Cf United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (recogniz-
ing separation of powers concern when legislature enacts vague law). The Court
states:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legisla-
tive department of the government.
Id.
138. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (discussing relationship between vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines in First Amendment context, saying:
Although ordinarily "[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied
to the conduct of others," we have relaxed that requirement in the First
Amendment context, permitting plaintiffs to argue that a statute is over-
broad because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of
protected speech.
Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
(1982))). But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719
(2010) (holding rule, that plaintiff whose conduct is plainly prohibited cannot at-
tack law's vagueness as applied to others, "makes no exception for conduct in the
form of speech") (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-57 (1974). The Court in
Holder went further, saying, "even to the extent a heightened vagueness standard
2011] 551
25
O'Grady: The End of Indecency - The Second Circuit Invalidates the FCC's I
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
552 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW jOURNAL
Nevertheless, as Justice Holmes suggested, common sense plays
an important role, even when laws restrict speech, and "perfect clar-
ity and precise guidance have never been required . . . ."139 But
when potentially vague language eludes a common sense under-
standing, the speech may have an "obvious chilling effect on free
speech."14 0 Moreover, vague laws "inevitably lead citizens to steer
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbid-
den areas were clearly marked."' 4 '
3. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine, which is often intertwined with the
vagueness doctrine, is essentially a special exception to the tradi-
tional standing requirement of a personalized injury.142 Normally,
litigants are prohibited from raising as a defense the effects of a
given law on third parties not before the court.14 3 In the First
Amendment context, however, the traditional requirement is
waived in favor of allowing parties to litigate the chilling effects of a
given law on third parties.14 4 The belief is that third parties will be
reluctant to speak if they think they can be prosecuted, even if their
applies, a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful
vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack of
notice. And he certainly cannot do so based on the speech of others." Id. Even so,
the Holder court highlighted the relation and ultimate distinction between vague-
ness and overbreadth, saying, "[s]uch a plaintiff may have a valid overbreadth
claim under the First Amendment, but our precedents make clear that a Fifth
Amendment vagueness challenge does not turn on whether a law applies to a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech." Id.
139. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).
140. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
141. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (footnote omitted).
142. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) ("The First Amendment
doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the stan-
dards for facial challenges."). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612
(1973) ("[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit-in the
First Amendment area-attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regu-
lated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.") (internal quotations
and citation omitted); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114 ("Because overbroad laws, like
vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish [a challenger's]
standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.").
143. See RicHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 114-15 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing standing doc-
trine and recognizing traditional requirement of personalized injury-in-fact).
144. See Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987) ("[A]n individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is per-
mitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens others not before
the court . . .") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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speech is most likely lawful.145 Thus, to protect these interests, the
overbreadth doctrine allows litigants, who in fact may be penalized,
to raise, as a complete defense, the law's intolerable effects on the
interests of third parties.14 6
Generally speaking, laws are overbroad when, by their terms,
they sweep in a substantial amount of protected speech. 4 7 Even
"[a] clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be overbroad if
in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct."14 8 For
example, "a statute making it a crime to use the words 'kill' and
'President' in the same sentence is not vague, but is clearly
overbroad." 4 9
The first step in an overbreadth analysis is to determine what
the challenged statute actually prohibits.15 0 After all, "it is impossi-
ble to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first
knowing what the statute covers."151 In determining the statute's
reach, the court "should evaluate the ambiguous as well as the un-
ambiguous scope of the enactment." 52 Thus, in this sense the
vagueness and overbreadth relate to each other.'53
Additionally, it is not enough that a statute reach some pro-
tected activity; the statute must be substantially overbroad before a
court will invalidate it.14 The common reason given for the sub-
stantiality requirement is that facial invalidation is "manifestly,
145. See id. (recognizing primary purpose of overbreadth doctrine is to pro-
tect rights of "those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who
may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the
law declared partially invalid.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
146. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 143, at 168-69 (discussing rationale for
overbreadth doctrine).
147. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) ("According to
our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohib-
its a substantial amount of protected speech.").
148. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
149. FALLON ET AL., supra note 143, at 168.
150. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 ("The first step in overbreadth analysis is to
construe the challenged statute.").
151. Id.
152. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
494 n.6 (1982).
153. See id. (recognizing overlap between vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines).
154. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 143, at 169-70 (discussing substantiality re-
quirement of overbreadth doctrine); see also Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) ("A statute may be invalidated on its face ...
only if the overbreadth is 'substantial.'") (citations omitted); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-
mate sweep.").
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strong medicine."155 Thus, the overbreadth doctrine serves to bal-
ance two competing interests: the protection of constitutional
speech from the chilling effects of an overbroad law on the one
hand, and the invalidation of a law with some permissible reach on
the other.156 Finally, the lawful speech reached by the statute must
be substantial as compared to the speech properly prohibited.157
After reviewing the statute, the FCC's regulation, and the FCC's
policy changes since Pacifica in 1978, the Second Circuit, in Fox II,
found that the Commission's policy could not survive the Networks'
vagueness challenge and invalidated the policy.15 8
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Fox II
Judge Rosemary Pooler's unanimous decision in Fox II began
with a description of the background of the case, particularly the
Supreme Court's Pacifica decision and the FCC's history of enforc-
ing the prohibition against indecency in the broadcast communica-
tions context.159 Judge Pooler then discussed the historical
interplay between broadcast media and indecent speech in First
Amendment jurisprudence.16 0 In particular, the court identified
155. Broadick, 413 U.S. at 613. The Court held that, without valid, limiting
construction, overbroad laws are void in total and recognizing such invalidation as
"manifestly, strong medicine." Id. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (recognizing over-
breadth doctrine as "strong medicine") (internal quotations and citation omitted);
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119-20 (2003) (explaining necessary precautions
before applying "strong medicine" of overbreadth invalidation) (citation omitted);
Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574 ("The requirement that the overbreadth be substan-
tial arose from our recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is
'manifestly, strong medicine.'") (citation omitted).
156. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (discussing balance sought by proper appli-
cation of overbreadth doctrine).
157. See id. ("In order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have vigorously
enforced the requirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial, not only in an
absolute sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.") (empha-
sis in original) (citations omitted).
158. For a detailed discussion of the Second Circuit's Fox II decision, see infra
Part IV. The Second Circuit's decision, which invalidated the FCC's indecency
policy in its entirety, only applies to the Second Circuit; therefore, the Commis-
sion's policy remains valid in every state except Connecticut, New York and Ver-
mont. See Taticchi, supra note 7, at 1104 (recognizing that Fox II has precedential
value in Second Circuit only).
159. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II), 613 F.3d 317, 319-25 (2d
Cir. 2010) (discussing background of case). For a detailed discussion of the back-
ground of Fox II, see supra notes 63-158 and accompanying text.
160. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 325-27(discussing legal treatment of indecent
speech, particularly in broadcast media).
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the "twin pillars of pervasiveness and accessibility to children" on
which the Pacifica decision rested.16'
The Networks argued that the world had substantially changed
since the Pacifica decision and that Pacifica's rationale for treating
broadcast television as unique no longer applied. 162 While the
Court agreed with the Networks that the current media environ-
ment was dramatically different in 2010 than it was in 1978, the
Court nevertheless felt bound by Supreme Court precedent to con-
tinue to recognize and apply special rules in the context of inde-
cent broadcasts.' 63 The conclusion that Pacifica still applies,
however, did not resolve this dispute.16 4
The FCC interpreted Pacifica as sanctioning broad regulatory
authority to prohibit indecent speech, with Carlin's monologue be-
ing an extreme example of a broad category of speech the Commis-
sion could prohibit as indecent.165 The Networks, on the other
hand, viewed the decision as establishing the limit of the Commis-
sion's authority. 166 In the Court's view, however, Pacifica was "an
intentionally narrow opinion," and therefore, "d[id] not provide
... a clear answer to [the] question." 67 The Court did not believe
it necessary, however, to "wade into the brambles in an attempt to
answer it [itself]."e168 "Regardless of where the outer limit of the
FCC's authority lies," the Court held, "the FCC's indecency policy is
unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague."169
161. Id. at 326.
162. See id. (acknowledging petitioner's argument that Pacifica's rationale no
longer applied in today's media environment).
163. See id. at 327 ("[A]s we stated in our previous decision, we are bound by
Supreme Court precedent, regardless of whether it reflects today's realities.").
The Court considered the argument that V-chip technology, which allows targeted
channel blocking on a household-by-household basis, essentially makes broadcast
television like cable, and therefore, under Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the
same level of scrutiny should apply to both. See id. (reviewing Reno holding and
concluding "[w]e can think of no reason why [Reno's] rationale for applying strict
scrutiny in the case of cable television would not apply with equal force to broad-
cast television in light of the V-chip technology that is now available."). Neverthe-
less, the Court felt that it was "not at liberty to depart from binding Supreme Court
precedent 'unless and until the Court reinterprets' that precedent." Id. (citations
omitted).
164. See id. ("There is considerable disagreement among the parties ... as to
what framework Pacifica established.").
165. See id. (summarizing FCC's broad view of its own authority to regulate
speech determined to be indecent).
166. See id. (summarizing Networks' narrow view of Pacifica holding).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The Court reviewed relevant case law related to the vagueness
doctrine before considering the parties' respective vagueness argu-
ments.o70 The Networks' argued that the FCC's policy was uncon-
stitutionally vague because it failed to provide a consistent,
knowable standard, thereby forcing individuals either to guess, at
their peril, what would be deemed indecent, and thus prohibited,
or avoid the line altogether, thereby potentially chilling lawful
speech.171 Moreover, the Networks relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Reno, which struck down as vague the same language
contained in the Commission's indecency policy.172 Thus, because
the FCC's indecency policy for broadcast media uses the same defi-
nition struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno, the Networks
argued, the Commission's broadcasting definition must be struck
down as well. 73 The FCC argued that the Reno Court's Internet
speech holding does not apply to the broadcasting context, and
moreover, that the Court there essentially foreclosed a vagueness
challenge to the Commission's broadcast media indecency defini-
170. See id. at 327-28 (summarizing vagueness doctrine). Specifically, the
Court recognized that the vagueness doctrines serves to void laws that fail to "give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is pro-
hibited." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, the Court
recognized that the Government bears the burden of proving that its restrictions
satisfy the Fifth Amendment's definiteness requirement. Id. (citations omitted).
Additionally, when a law implicates First Amendment rights, the law "will generally
be subject to a more stringent vagueness test." Id. (quotations and citations omit-
ted). Furthermore, the Court recognized that, while precision is not required,
some specificity is necessary in order to provide "fair notice," limit any possible
chilling effect and guard against "subjectivity and discriminatory enforcement."
See id. (discussing vagueness doctrine's principles and goals).
171. See id. (summarizing Networks' vagueness argument).
172. See id. (characterizing Networks' reliance on Reno); Remand Order, supra
note 48, para. 15 (stating FCC's patently-offensive-description-of-sexual-or-excre-
tory-activities indecency definition for broadcast media); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 859-60 (1997) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2006)) (discussing Communica-
tions Decency Act (CDA), which contains same language as FCC's broadcast media
indecency definition). In Reno, the Supreme Court considered Sections 223(a)
and (d) of the CDA, subsection (a) of which prohibited Internet transmissions of
"indecent" material to minors, while subsection (d) defined indecent material that
which "in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." See
id. at 859-60 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)) (discussing CDA). There, the Court
held that "[r]egardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth
Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage
render[ed] it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment." Id. at 870. Spe-
cifically, the Reno Court found that the "general, undefined terms indecent and
patently offensive cover[ed] large amounts of nonpornographic (sic) material with
serious educational or other value." Id. at 877. Thus, the CDA "unquestionably
silence[d] some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection." Id. at 874.
173. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 328 (summarizing Networks' Reno argument).
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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tion.1 7 4 The Second Circuit rejected both parties' Reno arguments
and determined that neither Pacifica nor Reno directly con-
trolled.175 The Court also rejected the FCC's argument that Pacifica
itself foreclosed a vagueness challenge to its indecency policy.176 At
this point, the Second Circuit set off to determine "whether the
FCC's indecency policy provides a discernable standard by which
broadcasters can accurately predict what speech is prohibited."17 7
The Court set forth the Commission's indecency policy after
reviewing the 2001 Indecency Policy Statement and the Golden Globes
order.1 7 8 The FCC argued that its policy, as explained in its Inde-
cency Policy Statement and subsequent adjudicative decisions, pro-
174. See id. at 329 (discussing FCC's Reno argument). In Reno, the Govern-
ment attempted to support its indecency definition by relying on the Pacifica deci-
sion. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 864 (discussing Government's Pacifica argument). The
Reno Court rejected the Government's Pacifica argument because, unlike the In-
ternet, the FCC had been regulating the broadcast media for decades; the CDA
presented a total ban, while the broadcasting regulations only limited indecent
broadcasts to specific times of the day; the Reno case involved a punitive order,
while the Pacifica decision did not; and finally, Internet speech, even if indecent,
receives full First Amendment protection, while broadcast media occupies a
unique place in First Amendmentjurisprudence. See id. at 867 (distinguishing situ-
ation in Pacifica from that before Court in Reno).
175. SeeFox II, 613 F.3d at 329-30 (discussing merits of each parties' Renoargu-
ments and concluding that neither Pacifica nor Reno controlled). The Court re-
jected the Commission's argument that Reno foreclosed a vagueness challenge in
the broadcast media context because it found that, in Reno, the Supreme Court did
not directly consider the vagueness question, but rather, merely the level of scru-
tiny to be applied to the Internet speech restrictions. See id. at 329 (finding that
Reno Court only addressed question of whether Internet speech was similar to
broadcast speech, justifying lesser level of First Amendment scrutiny). In Fox II,
the Court held that "[b]roadcasters are entitled to the same degree of clarity as
other speakers, even if restrictions on their speech are subject to a lower level of
scrutiny." Id. The Fox H1 Court also rejected the Networks' Reno argument, that the
same language considered unconstitutionally vague in Reno must be vague in the
broadcast media context, because "unlike in Reno, the FCC has further elaborated
on the definition of indecency . . . ." Id. In distinguishing Reno from prior cases,
the Second Circuit acknowledged the additional factors the Commission uses to
determine whether a broadcast is patently offensive and the fact that the Commis-
sion has declared "fuck" and "shit" to be presumptively indecent. See id. (distin-
guishing Reno). See generally Golden Globes, supra note 25, para. 7 (discussing
"patently offensive" factors); Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 74 (recognizing
presumptively indecent nature of both "fuck" and "shit").
176. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 329 (rejecting FCC's argument that Pacifica fore-
closed Networks' vagueness challenge because (1) Pacifica did not reach vagueness
issue, (2) its expressly narrow holding relied on FCC's "'restrained'" enforcement,
and (3) FCC's indecency policy changed dramatically since Pacifica and was no
longer "'restrained'") (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978)
(Powell J., concurring).
177. Id. at 330.
178. See id. (quoting Indecency Policy Statement, supra note 34, at 8002-03). See
generally Golden Globes, supra note 25, para. 6-7 (explaining Commission's indecency
policy).
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vides broadcasters with sufficient knowledge of what constitutes
prohibited broadcast speech.17 9 In determining the policy to be
unconstitutionally vague, the Court analyzed the policy's applica-
tion to numerous hypothetical situations not immediately at
issue.180
For example, the FCC declared that the word "bullshit" in an
episode of "NYPD Blue" was "patently offensive," but "dick" and
"dickhead" were not.18' According to the Court, the FCC's expla-
nation of these outcomes, despite referencing one or more of the
"patently offensive" factors, failed to explain how the factors ap-
plied, and thus amounted to little more than a finding that "'bull-
shit' is indecent because it is 'vulgar, graphic and explicit' while the
words [sic] 'dickhead' was not indecent because it was 'not suffi-
ciently vulgar, explicit, or graphic.'" 8 2 The Second Circuit cited
this outcome as an example of how the FCC's "patently offensive"
language can be used to arrive at any position the agency desires,
without a discernable standard that would allow broadcasters to
judge their programs for compliance.18 3
The court also addressed the FCC's argument that a flexible
standard was necessary because, when it enforced only the seven
words from Carlin's monologue, "broadcasters simply found offen-
sive ways of depicting sexual or excretory organs or activities with-
out using any of the seven words."184 The court turned this
argument against the FCC, however, recognizing that " [i]f the FCC
cannot anticipate what will be considered indecent under its policy,
then it can hardly expect broadcasters to do so."185 In addition, in
a not-so-rare moment of apparent contempt for the FCC's inde-
cency policy, the Court observed that people will always find ways to
subvert censorship laws and this fact of human nature "may expose
a certain futility in the FCC's crusade against indecent speech." 86
179. See Fox I, 613 F.3d at 330 (summarizing FCC's argument that its policy is
not impermissibly vague).
180. See id. at 330-33 (analyzing Commission's indecency policy in light of
vagueness principles).
181. See id. at 330 (citing Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 127-28) (analyz-
ing Commission's application of indecency policy to language in episode of "NYPD
Blue").
182. See id. (quoting Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 127-28) (criticizing
FCC's failure to explain sufficiently-vulgar-explicit-or-graphic-or-not test).
183. See id. (finding that Commission's "not sufficiently vulgar, explicit, or
graphic" test "hardly gives broadcasters notice of how the Commission will apply
the factors in the future").
184. Id. at 331.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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The Court further explained that the fact that people will attempt
to subvert such rules "does not provide a justification for imple-
menting a vague, indiscernible standard."187 Moreover, in the face
of the FCC's charge that all broadcasters consciously tried to push
the limits, the court defended the Networks, recognizing that they
"have expressed a good faith desire to comply with the FCC's inde-
cency regime."'88
In addition to criticizing the FCC's three-factor approach,
which essentially allowed arbitrary decision-making, the court also
found the Commission's near-absolute prohibitions on "fuck" and
"shit," and the exceptions, to be vague.189 Specifically, the Court
compared the FCC's treatment of several programs, including Sav-
ing Private Ryan, The Blues, and The Early Show.o90 In Steven
Spielberg's movie Saving Private Ryan, soldiers are depicted fight-
ing the Nazis in France, and as one might expect, they use coarse
language at times to express themselves.'19 The FCC found ABC's
unedited broadcast of the film not indecent because the film's vul-
gar language was "integral to the film's objective of conveying the
horrors of war."' 9 2 Martin Scorsese's documentary, The Blues,
which portrays interviews with numerous Blues musicians who occa-
sionally use unscripted, coarse language, did not qualify for the ex-
ception, however; the FCC not only found this language to be
indecent but also fined broadcasters $15,000 for airing the
speech.' 93 One Commissioner dissented from that finding, how-
ever, noting that "[i] t is clear from a common sense viewing of the
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 331-32 (discussing FCC's near-absolute prohibition on "fuck"
and "shit" and the exceptions, which were also deemed vague). The first excep-
tion is the so-called "bona fide news" exception, which the court found the FCC
had not explained "except to say that it is not absolute." Id. at 12. The second is
the "artistic necessity" exception, wherein fleeting expletives are allowed if "'de-
monstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work or essential to
informing viewers on a matter of public importance.'" Id. (quoting Omnibus Order,
supra note 41, para. 82). The "artistic necessity" exception looks largely to
"whether the material has any social, scientific or artistic value." In re Complaints
Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast on November 11,
2004, of the ABC Television Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving Private
Ryan", 20 FCC Rcd. 4507, para. 11 (2005) [hereinafter Saving Private Ryan].
190. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 331-32 (reviewing FCC's indecency analysis of three
broadcasts and determining that "[t]here is little rhyme or reason to these
decisions").
191. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (Paramount Pictures 1998).
192. Saving Private Ryan, supra note 189, para. 14.
193. See Omnibus Order, supra note 41, para. 74-78 (analyzing and determining
The Blues indecent because "the expletives in the program are vulgar, explicit,
graphic," and they are "dwelled upon and shocking to the audience"); Id. para. 85
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program that coarse language is a part of the culture of the individ-
uals being portrayed."1 94 The court identified these apparently
conflicting determinations and found that "broadcasters are left to
guess whether an expletive will be deemed 'integral' to a pro-
gram."' 95 Moreover, the court observed that the exceptions create
a standard that "even the FCC cannot articulate or apply consist-
ently."19 6 As the court noted, this problem directly implicated the
vagueness doctrine, which forbids rules that allow discriminatory or
arbitrary enforcement.19 7
The Court also addressed the FCC's argument that its context-
based approach was consistent with, and even required by,
Pacifica.'9" Judge Pooler countered this argument, however, by not-
ing that Pacifica was an intentionally narrow opinion that, while em-
phasizing the importance of context, did not purport to thoroughly
define the contours of the FCC's authority to define indecent
speech.199 Of course context is important, the Court admitted,
" [b] ut the FCC still must have discernible standards by which indi-
vidual contexts are judged."200 The FCC also argued that other
cases, namely ACT Iand Dial Information Services, precluded the Net-
works' vagueness challenges.201 The Court summarily dismissed
those arguments in a footnote, however, citing the ACT I decision's
reliance on FCC restraint, which, in the Second Circuit's view, it
had abandoned.20 2 The court also recognized that the Supreme
Court's Reno decision overruled Dial Information Services.2 0 3
The Court then discussed the possible chilling effect of the
FCC's indecency policy through several examples of broadcasters
refraining from airing certain programs.204 The FCC's policy, with
(concluding fine of $15,000 for "conscious and deliberate" broadcast appropriate);
THE BLUES (Road Movies Filmproduktion and Vulcan Productions 2003).
194. Omnibus Order, supra note 41, at 2728.
195. Fox II, 613 F.3d at 332.
196. Id.
197. See id. (discussing goal of vagueness doctrine to prevent arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement).
198. See id. at 333 (addressing FCC's argument that Pacifica required the Com-
mission's context-based approach).
199. See id. (rejecting FCC's argument that Pacifica required any specific
policy).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 329 n.8 (acknowledging FCC's case law argument that Net-
works' vagueness challenge must be dismissed).
202. See id. (rejecting FCC's argument that either ACT I supported Commis-
sion's position).
203. Id.
204. See id. at 333-35 (reviewing instances of third parties choosing not to air
programs because concerned about possible fines). One such program was the
[Vol. 18: p. 527
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its ill-defined exception for bona fide news broadcasts, chilled
speech "at the heart of the First Amendment."205 Moreover, as the
Court noted, the record contained numerous examples of chilled
broadcasts that contained no expletives. 206 In a sweeping statement
about the effect of the Commission's policy, the Court summarized:
[T]he absence of reliable guidance in the FCC's standards
chills a vast amount of protected speech dealing with some
of the most important and universal themes in art and
literature. Sex and the magnetic power of sexual attrac-
tion are surely among the most predominant themes in
the study of humanity since the Trojan War. The digestive
system and excretion are also important areas of human
attention. By prohibiting all "patently offensive" refer-
ences to sex, sexual organs, and excretion without giving
adequate guidance as to what "patently offensive" means,
the FCC effectively chills speech, because broadcasters
have no way of knowing what the FCC will find offensive.
To place any discussion of these vast topics at the broad-
caster's peril has the effect of promoting wide self-censor-
ship of valuable material which should be completely
protected under the First Amendment.207
B. Critical Remarks
The Second Circuit's decision champions a central element of
our liberty-free speech-and for that reason, it is hard to disagree
with the outcome. 208 Furthermore, the Court's vagueness analysis
appears to rely primarily on commonsense logic attendant to a nat-
Peabody Award-winning "9/11," which contains some expletives present in real
footage of firefighters at the World Trade Center on September 11th. See id. at 334
(describing Peabody Award-winning film "9/11"). Another was a radio station's
planned reading of Thomas Wolfe's I Am Charlotte Simmons, which the station pul-
led because of a single complaint about the novel's "adult" language and fear of
FCC reprisal. See id. (discussing reading of Wolfe's I Am Charlotte Simmons).
205. See id. at 334-35 (discussing chilling impact of FCC's policy on speech
related to issues central to human experience).
206. See id. at 335 (discussing some broadcasters' decisions not to air pro-
grams dealing with sexual health, including episode of "That 70s Show" that subse-
quently won award from Kaiser Family Foundation for its "honest and accurate
depiction of a sexual health issue").
207. Id.
208. For a summary of the Court's take on the FCC's policy in relation to the
First Amendment, and free speech in particular, see supra note 207 and accompa-
nying text.
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ural reading of the FCC's interpretations of its policy. 209 In short,
the decision is probably correct in concluding that the FCC must be
consistent in its application of the indecency policy. 210 Neverthe-
less, its analysis suffers from some weaknesses.211
For example, one issue with the court's analysis is that it does
not discuss previous vagueness challenges to the rules of other fed-
eral agencies. 212 This is problematic because, as mentioned above,
federal agencies are generally given extreme latitude in their deci-
sion-making. 213 It is not inconceivable that the Supreme Court,
given its decision above, would reverse the Second Circuit on this
point, citing the assumed expertise of the agency.2 14 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's decision above expressly found that the FCC's pol-
icy did not violate the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard,
and thus, it may be the case that the Commission's orders are not
vague under the Fifth Amendment.215
209. For example, the court's reasoning highlights the fact that, while the
FCC recognizes a "bona fide news" exception, especially for fleeting expletives, the
exception is not absolute and the FCC failed to provide sufficient guidance about
its applicability and contours. See Fox H, 613 F.3d at 331-32 (noting existence of
"bona fide news" exception but finding that broadcasters are left to guess, at their
peril, whether an exception would apply). Perhaps the most striking example of
the FCC's failure to define the "bona fide news" exception is the FCC's treatment
of The Early Show interview of a Survivor contestant. Compare Omnibus Order, supra
note 41, para. 141 (finding The Early Show's broadcast of "bullshitter" to be
"shocking and gratuitous" because it occurred "during a morning television inter-
view"), with Remand Order, supra note 48, para. 68 (reversing The Early Show "bull-
shitter" finding because broadcast was "a bona fide news interview").
210. For a discussion of the vagueness doctrine's prohibition against laws and
regulations that invite inconsistency through arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment, see supra notes 130-141 and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of Fox II's analytical weaknesses, see infra notes 212-226
and accompanying text.
212. Aside from mentioning the Supreme Court's Administrative Law deci-
sion reversing Fox I, the Second Circuit's Fox H opinion did not cite another Ad-
ministrative Law opinion. See generally Fox II, 613 F.3d 317 (addressing
Administrative Law decision above, but no others).
213. For a discussion of the deference federal courts give administrative agen-
cies, see supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
214. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009)
(rejecting Second Circuit's argument that pervasiveness of other forms of media,
to which today's children have nearly unlimited access, undercuts Pacifica's ratio-
nale treating broadcasting as unique, and therefore, properly treated differently
from cable, internet, commercial telephone messages and other forms of media);
id. ("The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul
language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as
cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give consci-
entious parents a relatively safe haven for their children.").
215. See id. ("We decline to 'substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency,'
and we find the Commission's orders neither arbitrary nor capricious." (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983))).
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An additional weakness of the Second Circuit's decision is its
failure to discuss the overbreadth doctrine, despite directly address-
ing the policy's effect on third parties. 2 1 6 As the Supreme Court
has said, the overbreadth doctrine in the First Amendment context
allows a party to challenge a regulation on its face where a substan-
tial amount of protected speech is potentially swept in under the
regulation's prohibitions.2 1 7 The Second Circuit did not confine its
holding merely to the FCC's "fleeting expletive" policy, but rather,
it found the Commission's "patently offensive" rule in its entirety to
be unconstitutionally vague because of the numerous legitimate
topics that it swept up by virtue of its ill-defined contours and ex-
ceptions.2 18 This is essentially an overbreadth approach, and yet,
the court did not acknowledge the overbreadth doctrine.219
The Court also refused to discuss the extent of the FCC's au-
thority under the Supreme Court's Pacifica opinion, but it essen-
tially did evaluate the extent to which Pacifica supports the FCC's
authority.220 Furthermore, the Court believed that FCC v. League of
Women Voters221 required application of intermediate scrutiny to
broadcast speech, but this belief fails to recognize that League of
Women Voters only applied intermediate scrutiny to the broadcast
balance-of-views context, which Red Lion Broadcasting Company. v.
216. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 332-35 (discussing application of FCC's indecency
policy to third party and hypothetical programming).
217. See Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987).
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose
own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a
statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court-
those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may
refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have
the law declared partially invalid.'
Id. (citation omitted).
218. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 335 ("By prohibiting all 'patently offensive' refer-
ences to sex, sexual organs, and excretion without giving adequate guidance as to
what 'patently offensive' means, the FCC effectively chills speech . . . .").
219. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 13 (arguing that while aban-
donment of restrained enforcement policy might have relevance in overbreadth
analysis, panel did not engage in such analysis).
220. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 329 (regarding question of extent of FCC author-
ity under Pacifica, "we do not need to wade into the brambles in an attempt to
answer it ourselves"). But see id. at 329, 333 (recognizing reliance of Pacifica con-
currence, which created 5-4 majority judgment, on FCC's assurance restrained en-
forcement policy would be maintained). Thus, despite its statement that it would
not "wade into the brambles" of defining Pacifica, the court actually determined,
rather simply, that Pacifica did not support the FCC's broad assumption of author-
ity because Pacifica itself was narrow and specifically relied on the FCC's assurances
of a restrained enforcement policy.
221. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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FCC22 2 allowed under the scarce-resource theory.223 The two stan-
dards are not necessarily the same, however, especially given the
different justifications for restrictions on indecent broadcast
speech, which potentially harms children and undermines parents'
authority in the home, and restrictions on all broadcast speech as a
class by virtue of the scarce nature of the broadcast spectrum. 224 In
this sense, the Court missed the opportunity directly to address the
ongoing validity of the FCC's strict regulation of indecency in the
broadcast medium, despite that medium's trend away from unique-
ness and towards the characteristics of cable television, which, in
Playboy, the Supreme Court said receives the highest First Amend-
ment protection. 225 The special significance of such a finding lies
in the recognition that, in today's era of television ratings systems
and V-chip technology, the FCC's policy is no longer the least re-
strictive means of accomplishing its goals of protecting children
and supporting parents.22 6
222. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
223. See Fox II, 613 F.3d at 324-25 (acknowledging that Pacifica did not specify
level of review for restrictions on broadcast speech, but finding that League of Wo-
men Voters used intermediate scrutiny); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 374-80)
(analyzing speech restrictions of broadcast speech under Red Lion's scarce-resource
justification).
224. Compare Red Lion,, 395 U.S. at 376 (discussing need for government regu-
lation of broadcasting, including "fairness doctrine," due to scarce nature of elec-
tromagnetic spectrum), with FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978)
(identifying protection of children from harmful language, support of parents'
prerogative to control language present in their home and unique ability for
broadcast speech to enter home without permission as justifications for restrictions
on indecent broadcast speech).
225. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox Television Stations), 129 S. Ct.
1800, 1819-20 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Red Lion and Pacifica were uncon-
vincing when they were issued, and the passage of time has only increased doubt
regarding their continued validity. The text of the First Amendment makes no
distinctions among print, broadcast, and cable media, but we have done so in these
cases.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); In re Annual Assessment of
the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming,
24 FCC Rcd. 542, para. 8 (2009) (highlighting that today viewers can often alter-
nate between broadcast and non-broadcasts stations with click of remote control);
In re Implementation of the Child Safe Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Con-
trol Technologies for Video or Audio Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 11413, para. 126
(2009) [hereinafter CSVA Report] (discussing how broadcasting is no longer
unique in its ability to reach into Americans' homes); Id. para. 11,n.20 (explaining
that every television in United States sold after January 1, 2000 contains V-chip
technology, allowing parents to set restrictions on type of programming children
can access, and that older televisions have access to V-chip technology through
digital converter boxes).
226. See CSVA Report, supra note 225, para. 10-24 (evaluating V-chip technol-
ogy and finding chip very useful for allowing parents to control their children's
access to certain programming); Id. para. 24 (identifying primary method of in-
creasing V-chip effectiveness will be educating public about device).
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V. THE FUTURE OF INDECENCY
The Fox I decision is a significant development in the law of
indecency.227 The decision is especially important because it deals,
head on, with a confluence of issues that face millions of Americans
every day.228 Among these issues is the free speech guarantee of
the First Amendment, the importance of which cannot be over-
stated.22 9 One effect of this ruling may be to force the FCC to ac-
knowledge that the First and Fifth Amendments forbid the
Commission the discretion to decide what will qualify as a "bona
fide news interview" without providing broadcasters with a consis-
tent explanation. 230 In addition, by declaring the FCC's indecency
enforcement policy unconstitutionally vague, the Second Circuit
has potentially eviscerated a linchpin of the FCC's existence-regu-
lation of indecent speech on broadcast television and radio com-
munications.2 3 ' On the other hand, the ruling's precedential value
is limited to the Second Circuit, and because the Petitioners did not
ask for an injunction, the FCC may continue to apply its indecency
policy outside the Second Circuit.232
The controversy is not over, however. On August 25, 2010, the
FCC filed a petition with the Second Circuit for rehearing, or alter-
natively, rehearing en banc. 23 3 According to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, such a petition should be granted only when
rehearing is necessary to "secure or maintain uniformity of the
Court's decisions" or "the proceeding involves a question of excep-
227. See Taticchi, supra note 7, at 1104 (recognizing that Fox II struck down
FCC's indecency regulation in total, at least within Second Circuit).
228. For a discussion of the significance of indecency regulations and the
competing interests of Americans with respect to them, see supra note 6 and ac-
companying text.
229. See supra note 6 and accompanying text and Part III.C for a discussion of
the interests at stake and consequences of vague laws on First Amendment rights.
230. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox II), 613 F.3d 317, 332 (2d
Cir. 2010) (noting FCC's inconsistent application of "bonafide news interview" ex-
ception to indecency policy).
231. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a discussion of the breadth
and importance of the FCC's regulation of broadcast media.
232. See Petitioner's Brief on Remand, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC,
No. 06-1760-ag(L) (2d Cir. Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily
Releases/DailyBusiness/2010/db0813/DOC-300908A1.pdf (requesting only that
Second Circuit panel vacate FCC's Remand Order); Taticchi, supra note 7, at 1104
(noting limited effect of Second Circuit's decision).
233. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 15 (petitioning Second Cir-
cuit to rehear case either with original panel or en banc); see also Dan Kirkpatrick,
Fox v. FCC: FCC Concentrates and Asks Again, COMMLAWBLOG (Aug. 29, 2010), http:/
/www.commlawblog.com/2010/08/articles/broadcast/fox-v-fcc-fcc-concentrates-
and-asks-again (discussing FCC's rehearing petition and rehearing procedure
generally).
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tional importance. "234 In its petition for rehearing, the FCC argued
that rehearing was necessary because the Second Circuit's decision
(1) effectively precludes the Commission from enforcing Section
1464, preventing the agency from fulfilling its congressionally-man-
dated mission; (2) conflicts with Pacifica, ACT I, and Dial Information
Services- and (3) goes beyond the scope of the litigation by evaluat-
ing the entire policy, rather than limiting its review specifically to
the FCC's "fleeting expletive" policy.23 5
In response, Fox Television Stations, Inc. argued each of the
FCC's points in turn: (1) the FCC is not precluded from enforcing
Section 1464, which it did without serious attack for more than
twenty years; (2) the cases on which the FCC relies do not dictate
the outcome of this case because they were either extremely narrow
(Pacifica), unpersuasive (D.C. Circuit's ACT 1), or overruled (Dial
Information Services); and (3) the panel necessarily went beyond the
"fleeting expletive" policy because the real source of the dispute
was the "patently offensive" definition. 236 On November 22, 2010,
the Second Circuit summarily denied the FCC's motion for rehear-
ing or rehearing en banc. 237 Widespread news of the denial was
delayed until January 4, 2011, however, apparently because the
Court filed the denial under one of the companion dockets that
many people were not actively following. 238 Thus, many only re-
234. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (1)-(2). Petitions for rehearing en banc are gener-
ally disfavored, and in evaluating them, all the active judges on a circuit consider
the merits of rehearing and vote on whether to grant the petition. See Fed. R. App.
P. 35(a) (stating that rehearing petitions shall be evaluated by active judges in
given circuit and dispensed with by majority vote, and also that rehearing and re-
hearing en banc are disfavored procedures).
235. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 10-15 (summarizing argu-
ments favoring grant of petition for rehearing). The Second Circuit did recognize
that the "fleeting expletives" policy was at issue, however, and it further acknowl-
edged that the Commission's policy regarding "fleeting expletives" was based upon
its "patently offensive" definition. See Fox I, 613 F.3d at 331-32 (evaluating FCC's
"fleeting expletive" policy relating to "fuck" and "shit"). Therefore, a complete
review of the FCC's "fleeting expletives" policy necessarily required the court to
evaluate the "patently offensive" policy as well. See id. (reviewing FCC's "fleeting
expletives" policy).
236. See Opposition to Rehearing, supra note 9, at 10-15 (arguing against
FCC's petition for rehearing).
237. See Order Denying Federal Communications Commission's Petition for
Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc [hereinafter Order Denying Rehearing], 613
F.3d 317 (No. 06-5358), available at http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/Daily-Bus-
iness/2011/db0112/DOC-304064A1.pdf (denying FCC's petition for rehearing or
rehearing en banc).
238. SeeJohn Eggerton, Second Circuit Denies Full-Court Review of Fox Decision,
BROADCASTING AND CABLE (Jan. 4, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.
com/article/461782-Second_CircuitDeniesFullCourtReviewOfFoxDeci-
sion.php (reporting that court apparently filed all documents under companion
40
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ceived the news when the Second Circuit handed down a summary
order vacating a fine against ABC for scripted nudity in the televi-
sion show "NYPD Blue."2 39
In the view of the FCC, the Second Circuit's Fox H decision was
an unnecessarily broad and disruptive ruling.240 In fact, one un-
identified FCC official recently told Broadcasting & Cable's John
Eggerton that " [t] he Second Circuit decision was so broad in scope
that it leaves us little or no ability to address broadcast indecency at
this time."241 That may not be enough to place the issue before the
docket, thereby eluding some observers). Both the FCC and Fox apparently agree
that there are three docket numbers associated with Fox H: 06-1760-ag, 06-2750-ag,
and 06-5358-ag. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9 (listing three docket num-
bers on title page); Opposition to Rehearing, supra note 9 (same). According to
the title pages of both the FCC's petition for rehearing and Fox's brief in opposi-
tion to rehearing, both parties also apparently believed that docket number 06-
1760-ag was the lead case. See id. (indicating on title pages of each document that
06-17 60-ag is lead case by making its font many times larger than fonts of other
docket numbers and including an "(L)" after docket number, indicating this to be
lead case). Despite the apparent fact that the parties recognized 06-1760-ag as the
lead case, the Second Circuit filed the November 22 denial under only one docket
number: 06-5358-ag. See Order Denying Rehearing, supra note 237 (including only
06-5358-ag docket number).
239. See Eggerton, supra note 238 (explaining that, for many, first news of
denial in Fox H came because Second Circuit's summary order in ABC v. FCC in-
cluded a weight-of-authority parenthetical following a citation to the Fox H case);
Summary Order Vacating Fine in ABC, Inc., et al v. FCC [hereinafter ABC Sum-
mary Order], No. 08-0841-ag(L) (Jan. 4, 2011) (citing Fox II in order vacating inde-
cency fine against ABC and affiliates and including weight-of-authority
parenthetical indicating that Second Circuit had denied rehearing and rehearing
en banc in Fox Il). See also Press Release, The Parents Television Council, PTC
Calls Out Second Circuit Court for "Covert Jurisprudence" (Jan. 4, 2011), available
at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/news/release/2011/0104a.asp (criticizing Sec-
ond Circuit for filing rehearing denial under companion docket number and thus
failing to properly notify counsel involved in case).
240. See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 2 ("[T]he panel decision
threatens to have a wide-ranging adverse impact on the FCC's ability to enforce
federal statutory restrictions on the broadcast of indecent material. Rehearing ...
is thus necessary . . . to address exceptionally important questions about the
agency's ability to enforce federal law.") (citation omitted). See also id. at 15 (argu-
ing extreme importance of panel's decision, saying, "the ... decision threatens to
transform the public airwaves from a 'relatively safe haven for . . . children' to a
medium that mirrors the 'pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of
public entertainment' that characterize 'other media, such as cable.'"). The Net-
works agree that Fox II implicates very important issues, but they believe the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision is correct under the law. See Opposition to Rehearing, supra
note 9, at 15 (arguing that burden to "articulate some reasonably clear indecency
standard" should remain on FCC's shoulders).
241. See John Eggerton, FCC Source: justice Undecided on Fox Profanity Appeal,
BROADCASTING AND CABLE (Mar. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.broadcasting
cable.com/article/465888-FCCSource-justice-UndecidedOnFoxProfanity
Appeal.php (quoting anonymous FCC official regarding FCC's ability to enforce
indecency laws and regulations in wake of Second Circuit's Fox II decision).
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Supreme Court, however.242 The Solicitor General's office has re-
cently requested, and received, two thirty day extensions to file a
petition for certiorari, giving the Government until April 21, 2011
to make an appeal decision. 243 As this article goes to the printer,
the Government has not yet made an appeal decision and still has
approximately three weeks to consider the matter. If the Govern-
ment does decide to appeal the ruling, however, the Justices may
well grant review, given the importance of the issues at stake, the
Supreme Court's suggestion in the opinion above that the FCC's
policy may unconstitutionally chill protected speech, and the seri-
ous questions regarding the continued viability of the FCC's author-
ity to restrict broadcast speech. 244
John V. O'Grady*
242. See Eggerton, FCC Source: justice Undecided on Fox Profanity Appeal, supra
note 241 (discussing Solicitor General's requests for extensions on filing deadline
for petition for certiorari and statement from FCC source thatJustice Department
is undecided on whether to appeal Fox II decision); see also The Parents Television
Council, Demand Appeal of 2nd Circuit Ruling, available at https://www.parentstv.
org/PTC/action/DecencyAppeal/main.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (urging citi-
zens to contact President Obama and demand that he direct Department ofJustice
to appeal Fox II decision to Supreme Court).
243. See DOCKET No. 10A794, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10a 794 .htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2011) (listing Feb. 10 and Mar. 10 requests for filing extensions, and
grants of those requests by justice Ginsburg, as first docket entries in potential case
of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.); see also John Eggerton, Government Seeks
More Time to Appeal Fox Profanity Decision, BROADCASTING AND CABLE (Feb. 11, 2011,
3:32 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/463835-Government Seeks
MoreTime.to.AppealFoxProfanity-Decision.php?rssid=20065 (reporting on
Solicitor General's request to Supreme Court for time extension to file Govern-
ment's petition for certiorari in Fox Il).
244. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009)
(ordering remand to consider Petitioner Fox's constitutional arguments, saying,
"It is conceivable that the Commission's orders may cause some broadcasters to
avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission's reach under the Constitu-
tion. Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be deter-
mined soon enough, perhaps in this very case."); Press Release, Federal
Communications Commission, Statement of Commissioner MichaelJ. Copps (July
13, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-
299761A1.pdf (expressing shock at Second Circuit's decision and highlighting im-
portance of FCC indecency regulation in safe-guarding public airwaves for benefit
of millions of American parents and children); Harry Cole, Indecency in a Post-Fox
World: What's Up Next?, COMMLAwBLOG (July 16, 2010), http://www.commlawblog.
com/2010/07/articles/broadcast/indecency-in-a-postfox-world-whats-up-next/
(forecasting possible outcomes depending on FCC's future moves on Fox II case
and discussing Supreme Court's possible interest in reviewing Fox II).
* J.D. candidate, May 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. in En-
glish & Economics, magna cum laude, 2006, University of Georgia.
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